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Abstract0
This study experimentally implements theories [14] about consumer preferences toward en-
vironmental policies that hypothetically decrease the uncertainty of consequences of global
temperature increase. We first measure individual risk and time preferences, then conduct
a series of choice experiments using investments in a global warming model. We find that
subjects consistently spend more than their optimal consumption point as predicted by their
stated preferences.
Introduction
Global warming is among the most prominent sociopolitical issues of our time, yet little
action occurs due to the stalemate created by polarized opinions of policymakers and the
general public [7]. Without delving into the political debate, it’s clear that uncertainty is
largely to blame for the gridlock surrounding global warming progress [17].
Even the scientific community is unable to reach a consensus about how to treat global
warming moving forward [16]. Integrated Assessment Models have been the standard for
global warming predictions by entities like the EPA, but these models are based largely on
assumptions rather than empirical evidence [13].
To address this issue, Pindyck (2014) turns to the consumer side of environmental policies,
modeling willingness to pay for reductions in the drift and volatility of global temperature
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increase [14]. Rather than trying to predict the future, Pindyck estimates how people value
policies aimed at reducing expected future damage versus future uncertainty. Pindyck’s work
represents an important step in a different direction for environmental policy research, but
it still relies heavily on theory and assumptions rather than empirical evidence.
The present study attempts to further investigate consumer preferences regarding envi-
ronmental policy by using human subjects to test the theoretical groundwork laid so far.
Similar to Pindyck’s (2014) approach, we examine individual risk and time preferences, and
investment in theoretical reduction of future risk and uncertainty. This data allows us to test
the differences between stated and actual preferences surrounding future risk and uncertainty
mitigation in global warming policy.
Literature
While the main literary basis and logic behind the present research is explained above [14],
details like variable measurement surveys still require discussion.
The concept of individual risk preference is central to both Pindyck’s (2014) paper and
the current research. Bernoulli (1738) first observed a discrepancy between expected value
and expected utility as lottery stakes increased in the St. Petersburg paradox [5]. Almost 200
years later, Binswanger (1980) was one of the first researchers to experimentally implement
a lottery choice list where participants choose between a series of ”safe” and ”risky” gambles
[6]. The current standard for risk elicitation through surveys was set by Holt and Laury’s
(2002) Multiple Price List task [12]. In this task, participants choose between safe and
risky alternatives for a series of ten paired gambles. The high and low payout possibilities
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remain the same for each choice, but the probability of the high payout increases while
the probability of the low payout decreases with each choice. Therefore, the risky choice
becomes more enticing as the participant moves down the list, and the point at which he
switches implies his risk preference. This method has been tested and validated numerous
times [2] [9], plus it’s simple to explain and understand, so we use the MPL to measure risk
preferences in the present research.
Time preferences are similar to risk preferences, and the two are usually viewed in con-
junction, but they are separate phenomena [4]. Until recently, most the time preference
literature focused on finding the optimal discounting function [10] without really considering
non-linear individual utility functions. Andersen et al. (2008) are among the first to come up
with an experimental measure that jointly measures risk and time preferences, which they
call the Double Multiple Price List [1]. The DMPL collects responses from a lottery choice
survey followed by an intertemporal choice survey. Risk coefficients from the first survey
are used to inform the individual utility curves underlying the calculation of the discount
rate from the intertemporal survey. The resulting discount rates tend to be lower than those
under assumed risk neutrality [1]. Andreoni et al. (2013) examine the validity of the DMPL
compared to their Convex Time Budget measure of discount rate estimation [3]. They find
that their CTB measure has slightly more predictive validity than the DMPL. However,
the CTB does not explicitly measure risk preferences, so the DMPL is better suited for our
research.
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Methods
Participants (n=56) were drawn from six upper-division economics classes at CU Boulder.
The professors of those six classes sent out an email with instructions and the survey link to
their class rosters. The only eligibility requirement was enrollment in one of the six classes.
Over 200 invitations went out, and 56 subjects took the survey. One outlier was dropped
from the dataset.
Subjects completed a series of three surveys followed by a choice experiment, all through
Qualtrics. The surveys were explained to participants as measures of general information
and beliefs, as well as risk and time preferences. Subjects were instructed that they would
be paid a $5 for their participation, and that their responses to the surveys would not effect
their eventual payout.
The choice experiment was framed as a Global Warming Game, where subjects could
choose to invest any amount of their $5 credit to mitigate simulated global temperature
increase as modeled by a random distribution. Participants received $5 less their investment
during their class following the conclusion of the study. Three weeks later, they received
some amount of money based on a random draw from their shifted distribution.
Details about each component are as follows:
Surveys
General Information
Participants first indicated their gender, followed by the highest level of statistics coursework
they completed. Subjects then used a sliding Likert scale to report their overall understand-
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Figure 11: MPL and Risk Coefficients2
ing of five statistical concepts used later in the study.
Participants then answered a series of questions about their global warming beliefs, begin-
ning with whether or not they think global warming is happening. Subjects then indicated
their perceived global warming risk by answering four questions on sliding Likert scales.
These questions asked about perceived threat level, immediacy, concern and activism in
promoting global warming awareness.
The full version of this survey is provided in Appendix A.
Multiple Price List
Participants completed the Multiple Price List Task [12], which consists of choices between
a ”safe” gamble (Option A) and a ”risky” gamble (Option B) for ten pairs of gambles.
These choices are presented in Figure 1. The payoffs for Options A ($10 vs $2) and Option
B ($19.25 vs $1) remain the same, but the probability of the high payoff increases. The
assumption is that participants will choose a series of safe options before switching to the
risky option, and that the number of safe options chosen suggests the degree of risk aversion.
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Figure 2: IMPL and Discount Factors
The point at which this switch occurs infers the participant’s risk coefficient r. The coefficient
is bounded because the indifference point lies somewhere between two discrete choices, so
an exact number cannot be estimated.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion is assumed, so we use the utility function
U(x) =

x1−r
1−r : r 6= 1
ln(x) : r = 1
where r < 0 suggests risk-seeking preferences, r = 0 implies risk neutrality, and r > 0 is
associated with risk aversion. The choice set is defined such that four safe choices followed by
six risky choices implies risk neutrality, with r ∈ (−.17, .13). The rest of the risk coefficients
are shown in Figure 1.
Intertemporal Multiple Price List
Next, participants completed the Intertemporal Multiple Price List [2], or IMPL, to elicit
their time preferences. The form of the survey is very similar to the MPL, but subjects
1Participants were shown only the first two columns–the probabilities associated with each choice.
2The payoffs are very similar to those used by Holt and Laury (2002), scaled up by five.
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choose between $20 in three weeks (Option B), or a smaller amount of money today (Option
A) for six pairs of serial choices. The present amount of money associated with Option A
decreases with each choice, so individual discount rates for the three week time horizon are
elicited by examining the switch point from Option A to Option B. For example, someone
who chooses Option A five times before switching to Option B has a very high discount rate,
and values present income significantly more than future income. The equation used to
calculate the discount rate is U(Mk) = U(Mk+t)
1
(1+d)t
where k signifies the delay before the
initial payment, t equals the time elapsed between payments, and d represents the discount
rate [4]. For the present survey, k=0, t=21, and M0 = 20. The utility function here is
the same CRRA function as above, and d is calculated for each unique (r, M) pair. For
simplicity, I will use the discount factor δ = 1
(1+d)t
from this point on. Figure 2 shows the
payouts for each option, and the implied range of discount rates associated with each choice3.
The Global Warming Game
The experimental portion of the study was presented as a global warming simulation. Par-
ticipants read about a scenario called the Global Warming Game, in which they receive a
$10,000 check tomorrow, and will receive another check for an amount inversely proportional
to the global temperature increase in ten years. They’re told that they could invest some of
the current income to mitigate against future temperature increase, and therefore decrease
the likelihood of a future bad outcome.4 The point of this anecdote is to prime subjects to
3For simplicity, only the discount factors calculated at the midpoint of the risk neutral interval (r=-.02)
are shown.
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Figure 3: U(0) = U(α) Figure 4: Maximum α
think about global warming mitigation, and to provide tangible context for the somewhat
complicated tasks that follow.
Participants are then informed that they have received a $5 credit for their completion of
the surveys, which represents their current income as they perform three independent tasks
similar to the Global Warming Game. They are reminded that the $5 less their investment
in the randomly chosen task will be available during their next class, and that money based
on a random draw from their altered distribution will be available in three weeks.5
Note that the next three sections describe the remainder of the procedure without going
into detail about the underlying mathematics. I save the bulk of this discussion for the
Technical Notes section, which follows immediately after.
4The exact explanation provided to participants can be found in Appendix B.
5The exact explanation provided to participants can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 5: U(0) = U(β) Figure 6: Maximum β
Task 1: Adjusting α
Participants are told that they will adjust the ”location” parameter, or expected value, of the
distribution. They indicate how much they would like to spend by moving a slider between
$0 and $5, which also displays how much the expected value increases. Figure 3 shows the
point at which total utility begins to decrease under assumed risk neutrality (cost=$.5) and
Figure 4 depicts the maximum input (cost=$5).
Task 2: Adjusting β
Participants are now instructed that they will be adjusting the ”scale” parameter, or variance,
of the distribution. They again move the slider between $0 and $5 to indicate their input,
and the numerical decrease in variance is shown alongside the distribution animation. Figure
5 illustrates the point at which total utility begins to decrease under assumed risk neutrality
(cost=$.5) and Figure 6 shows the maximum input (cost=$5)
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Figure 7: U(0, 0) = U(β, α) Figure 8: Maximum β
Task 3: Adjusting α & β
Participants next adjust both parameters α and β. The underlying cost functions for α and β
remain the same, but the input is now two-dimensional. This means the slider is constrained
to the triangle defined by cα + cβ ≤ 5 with 0 ≤ cα,cβ. Participants can move the slider
anywhere inside the triangular plane. Figure 7 shows the upper-bound for positive net utility
(cost=($.5, $1)) and Figure 8 represents one of the maximum inputs (cost=($2.44,$2.66)).
Technical Notes
Distribution
We use the following unnamed variation of the logistic distribution6 for all three tasks:
F (x) = 1− e
α
β
(e
α
2β +e
x
β )2
6To my knowledge, this is an original distribution, and this paper marks the first use of it.
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f(x) = 2e
α+x
β
β(e
α
2β +e
x
β )3
E[x] = α
2
− β V ar[x] = β2(pi2−3)
3
This distribution is useful because the two parameters can easily be disentangled so
that αalone determines the mean and βthe variance–a rarity for skewed two-parameter
distributions. The PDF graph also resembles the normal distribution, which most people
have been exposed to. The distribution also has fat-tails, which is consistent with the
potential for catastrophic climate change outcomes [15]. However, payouts in the study were
bounded below by zero and unbounded above, so we had to reduce the variance and therefore
the area in the tails to hedge against the potential for an extremely costly study.
Each task begins with β = 2 and α = 12, meaning that to start, µ = 4 and σ2 = 9.16.
Both parameters ”shift” the distribution in response to the movement of a slider. The slider
serves as the input of two functions: α = 12 + 2
√
c and β = 2 −
√
c
2
with 0 ≤ c ≤ 5
where c represents the cost of changing the distribution and is subtracted from the initial $5
endowment. Therefore, on the first task α moves between 9 and 16.47, and E[x] ∈ (4, 6.24).
These functions were constructed such that the optimal consumption point for a risk-neutral
individual would be relatively low, and reducing β would be about twice as costly as reducing
α.
Since we wanted β to only shift the variance in the distribution, we had to modify the
expected value equation for the second two tasks. For these cases, E[x] = 12+α
2
− 2 ∗ (2− β)
so that the expected value stays constant as β moves between .88 and 2, meaning 1.74 ≤
V ar[x] ≤ 9.16.
The positive net utility points shown on the graphs above were calculated under the
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following assumptions: U(0) = U(xα) = 5− xα + (4+
√
xα)
1−r
1−r and
U(0) = U(xβ) = 5−xβ + (4+.5
√
xα)
1+r
1+r
. This implies that any point on the interval (0 , xα) or
(0 , xβ), respectively, will result in a net utility gain, while exceeding the maxima will yield
a lower utility than the starting point. These conditions hold true for all three tasks.
For the β utility function, I assume that a one point reduction in β is equivalent to at
least a two point increase in α, as implied by the unadjusted expected value function, so I
multiplied the
√
c term by .5. I also reversed the sign on the risk aversion coefficients under
the assumption that risk averse individuals would gain more utility from reductions in β than
risk loving individuals. These estimates may be slightly low, but under the assumptions of
expected utility risk-neutral and risk-loving individuals should be indifferent to all values of
β, thereby avoiding investing in it.
Animations and Programming
The sliders and PDF graphics were built using D3.js [8] which is a Javascript Library designed
specifically to embed interactive animations in webpages. Qualtric is able to embed custom
Javascript and CSS files, which allowed the animations to function inside of the survey and
also helped capture and consolidate subject response data. Since the equations defined above
for α and β are injective, we only needed to record participants’ ”c” values to identify their
individual shifted distributions. For Task 3 where the parameters were jointly adjusted, we
simply recorded the unique point (cβ, cα) inside of the plane constraining the domain of the
responses.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Results
We found that overall, participants spent significantly more than predicted by their risk and
time preferences. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the key measured variables,
and two predicted variables, A Max and B Max. A Max and B Max were calculated by
finding the point xm such that U(0) ≤ U(xm)∀ k ∈ (0, xm) for each level of risk aversion.
That is, any input higher than A Max or B Max, respectively, will yield an expected utility
lower than the expected utility of not investing at all.
This pattern of outspending the maximum predictions was statistically significant on Task
1 (t=3.25, p<.005) and Task 2 (t=5.19, p<.0001). The pattern was observed for β (t=4.15,
p<.001) but not α on Task 3. This could be due to the fact that α and β are substitutes in
Task 3 (corr=-.52, p <.0001) with participants exhibiting a stronger preference for β.
The average level of relative risk aversion suggests risk neutrality (-.17 <r <.13), whereas
the average coefficient is usually measured in the moderately risk averse range (.39 <r <.66)
[7]. This could be due to the population measured, since younger people tend to be less risk
averse [11]. Figure 9 shows a frequency distribution for the number of safe choices made on
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Figure 9: Counts for each level of Risk and Time Preferences
the MPL, as well as the frequency distribution for the number of safe choices made on the
IMPL.
The measured time preferences are inconsistent with the literature [1]. The average
discount factor under the assumption of risk-neutrality is .84, which is very low for a three-
week time horizon. When risk preferences are accounted for, the discount factor coefficient
decreases (t=-1.9, p<.1). The literature suggests that the discount factor should increase
when individual utility is accounted for, but this assumption only holds when 0<r, which
is generally not the case in this study. The correlation between risk preferences and the
discount factor based on risk preferences is positive and significant (t=3.7, p<.0005), which
is consistent with other findings. Time preferences are almost never measured for a time
horizon shorter than six months, and the lack of findings here might explain why.
None of the demographic characteristics came through as significant. This is likely due
to the small sample size and the homogeneity of subjects.
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Discussion
The inconsistencies in the results do not add up. Risk neutrality implies increased utility
from increased expected value, and indifference to the level of variability. Instead we see the
opposite, and none of the other variables provide insight. There are three main explanations
outside of the dataset.
The first is that participants did not understand the tasks. This would help explain the
large standard deviations associated with the variables, but the small sample size must also
be considered. The response rate was also very low. Over 200 invitations went out, and only
56 people participated in the study. There was no attrition once subjects began the survey,
meaning that two thirds of the subject pool did not attempt to access the survey.
The second possibility has to do with the influence of the framing effect. Participants were
primed to think about reducing temperature, which is more consistent with the thought of
decreasing variability than it is with increasing expected value. This would explain spending
patterns on Tasks 2 and 3, but not Task 1 where participants on average spent an irrationally
large amount of money on α.
Finally, it’s possible that the appearance of Task 3 biased participants. The range of
possible expected values is [4, 6.24], while variance ranges from [1.78, 9.16]. The cost of
reducing β by 1 unit is twice the cost of increasing α by one unit, but a change in β has a
larger absolute effect on variance than the same change in α has on expected value. Reducing
β also changes the appearance of the distribution more dramatically than increasing α, so it’s
likely that participants fallaciously believe that they’re getting more benefit from reducing
the variance, when in reality they’re acting against their own self-interests.
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Conclusions
In the context of Pindyck’s (2014) theories, our results suggest that people are willing to pay
significantly more than their utility-maximizing amount to reduce the drift and volatility of
temperature increase. However, several factors need to be addressed for that assertion to
have any real weight.
The small sample size caused fundamental statistical issues. Certain trends, like time
preferences, were likely washed out due to the high standard errors associated with each
coefficient. Along those lines, the sample also has very little statistical power with such
a small sample size. The sample used was also not at all representative of the general
population, which probably caused a significant amount of bias.
The next potential issue is a lack of understanding of the experimental tasks. A discrete
choice set would be more consistent with the rest of the survey and likely easier for sub-
jects to understand. This approach would also cut down on potential bias caused by false
comparisons made during the simultaneous task.
However, the sliders were novel and could have a wide variety of uses in experimental
measurements so long as participants have an explicit understanding of their task.
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Appendix A: Global Warming Survey
17
Appendix B: Global Warming Game Explanation
Appendix C: Payout Explanation
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